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Taming the Internet Pitchfork Mob:
Online Public Shaming, the Viral
Media Age, and the Communications
Decency Act
ABSTRACT
Accompanying the explosive growth of the Internet, one
lamentable trend is the rise of online public shaming. While online
public shaming may positively incentivize individuals to modify their
behavior in accordance with socially acceptable norms, there has also
been the emergence of an online "pitchfork mob" that can have a real
impact on individuals' livelihoods and overall wellbeing. Due to the
lack of legal remedies available to victims of certain types of online
shaming, this Note suggests that web hosts are empowered by the
expansive protections of the Communications Decency Act to develop
and implement policies to curb the prevalence of online public
shaming.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. GRAB YOUR PITCHFORKS: How ONLINE PUBLIC SHAMING
HAS EXPLODED IN POPULARITY ........... .............. 725
A. Colonial Public Shaming in America... ............725
B. Public Shaming 2.0: The Rise of Online Public
Shaming................................... 725
1. The Critical Role of Anonymity and Shaming's
Disproportionate Effects..... .......... 728
2. The Important Distinction Between Online
Shaming, Defamation, and Other Torts.......730
II. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AND SUBSEQUENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN ISP LIABILITY FOR THIRD-PARTY
STATEMENTS........................................... 732
A. The Advent of the Communications Decency Act.....733
B. The Post-Zeran Landscape: Broad ISP Immunity .. 736
721
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
C. Scholarly Critiques of the CDA Incentive
Framework ..................................... 739
III. How WEB HOSTS CAN AND SHOULD UTILIZE THE
EXISTING SECTION 230(C) FRAMEWORK TO TAME THE MOB 741
A. Altering Choice Architecture to Discourage
Shaming. ............... 742
B. Anticipated Objections ................... ..... 744
1. ISPs Lack the Incentive to Develop Anti-
Sham ing Policies........................................... 744
2. Free Speech Concerns.................... 745
IV. CONCLUSION............. ........................ 745
In 2013, Justine Sacco, former head of public relations for
InterActiveCorp, forever shattered her career and personal life in
roughly 140 characters.' With a mere 170 Twitter followers, Sacco
carelessly posted a racist tweet regarding her upcoming trip to South
Africa.2 While undoubtedly in poor taste, the resulting firestorm sent
shockwaves through the Internet.3 Within hours of posting the fateful
tweet, Sacco garnered rage that only the Internet could provide, and
she became the number-one trending topic on Twitter with users
fiercely calling for her resignation.4 The fallout from Sacco's tweet is
still infamous, even years later.5  Sacco lost her job at
InterActiveCorp, and despite her efforts to avoid social media, the
same Gawker magazine journalist who re-tweeted Sacco's initial lethal
tweet updated Gawker online magazine subscribers whenever Sacco
tried to get a new job, effectively sabotaging Sacco's efforts to move on
from her past gaffe.6
The Justine Sacco incident is noteworthy for many reasons. It
demonstrates the necessity for individuals to "think before they
speak," or, in this case, to think before they tweet, post, or comment
online. It also demonstrates the fierce and swift nature of online






5. Patrick Blanchfield, Twitter's Outrage Machine Should Be Stopped., WASH. POST
(Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/02/24/twitters-rage
-mob-should-be-stopped-but-justine-sacco-is-the-wrong-poster-child/ [https://perma.cclU9R4
-62NJ].
6. Ronson, supra note 1; see also Sam Biddle, Justine Sacco Is Back, GAWKER (June 17,
2014, 9:45 AM), http://valleywag.gawker.com/justine-sacco-is-back-1591951969
[https://perma.cc/DX5W-84ZV].
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vengeance against those who have committed behavior the Internet
deems unacceptable.
Online public shaming since the Sacco incident has increased
and changed in nature. In late September 2015, a new version of
online public shaming emerged with the "Peeple app." Dubbed "Yelp
for People," the app initially sought to grant users the ability to rate
an individual on a one-to-five-star scale without the individual's
consent, leading to anyone becoming a target of users' ratings.
7
Another infamous example of "shaming gone wrong" occurred after
Minnesota dentist Walter Palmer killed beloved Cecil the Lion on an
African hunting trip; outraged individuals subsequently trashed
Palmer's Yelp page for his dental practice, filling it with vitriol related
not to his abilities as a dentist, but for his actions in Africa.
8
Nonetheless, online public shaming has created social positives
in the consumer context. For example, frustrated consumers have
increasingly been turning to Twitter to voice concerns about a
company's detrimental policies or poor customer service.
9
Unfortunately, these social positives do not translate to the individual
context as smoothly. While companies have substantial resources
available to handle their public relations, including entire social media
and marketing departments, most average citizens do not.
Consequently, the ills of online public shaming fall especially hard on
private citizens who become infamous on the internet overnight due to
instances of online shaming gone viral.
One trend has become clear: the Internet "pitchfork mob" can
have very real and sometimes wildly disproportionate effects on
individuals as compared to their offensive behavior.
10 Sacco lost her
job and continues to be professionally exiled; a Google search of her
7. Caitlin Dewey, Everyone You Know Will Be Able to Rate You on the Terrifying 'Yelp
for People', WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.comlnews/the-
intersect/wp/2015/09/30/everyone-you-know-will-be-able-to-rate-you-on-the-terrifying-yelp-for-
people-whether-you-want-them-to-or-not/ [http://perma.cc/8GRN-T4YK].
8. Dale Lately, A One-Star Human Being, SLATE (Aug. 21, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future-tense/2015/08/lion-killing-dentist-walter_palme
r-s.yelppageandthe_business of-internet.htm1 [https://perma.cc/TFQ6-R4NP]; see also Ed
Payne, Walter Palmer, the Man Who Killed Cecil the Lion, Returns to His Dental Practice, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/08/us/walter-palmer-dentist-cecil-lion-return/
[https://perma.cc/PXP6-8N2Y] (last updated Sept. 8, 2015).
9. Joe Silver, Shamed on Twitter, Corporations Do an About-Face, ARS TECHNICA (Apr.
21, 2014, 2:21 PM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2014/04/shamed-on-twitter-corporations
-do-an-about-face/ [https://perma.cc/7MA7-ELBM].
10. For the purposes of this Note, a "pitchfork mob" refers to the general phenomenon of
an angry mob going after an unpopular figure. For more information on the meaning and history
of the pitchfork mob, see Torches and Pitchforks, TV TROPES,
http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.phplMain/TorchesAndPitchforks [https://perma.cc/GXT7-P8
FC] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
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name still reveals the fallout from the tweet.11 Palmer faces a trashed
reputation for his dentistry practice, which arguably has nothing to do
with his hunting exploits.12
Unfortunately, the recourse for those shamed online is limited.
Depending on the type of online shaming, victims may not be able to
pursue any existing form of legal remedy.13 For example, even though
stating an unfavorable opinion online about someone's
actions-disapproval of Justine Sacco's Tweet, for example-may be
catalogued in large quantities on Google in perpetuity, wreaking
untold havoc on both professional and personal reputations, such an
action may not fall within the traditional definition of the tort of
defamation.14 Even if a victim can indeed state a claim for defamation
against an online harasser, tracking down the online tortfeasor is
notoriously difficult.15 Adding further insult to injury, even in the
instance that an individual is able to identify the harasser and state a
cause of action, the harasser may be insolvent and unable to pay
damages.
This Note explores the recourse available to individuals
publicly shamed online. Part I analyzes the nature of online public
shaming, the tangible harms it creates for individuals, and the unique
nature of online public shaming compared to other harms. Part II
explores the Communications Decency Act, which immunizes Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) for the publication or distribution of certain
tortious content created by third parties and also enables ISPs to
create policies to filter online content without facing liability. Part III
advocates for ISPs to utilize these expansive protections that the CDA
provides to develop and implement new policies designed to deter the
prevalence of shaming. Part III advances one model in which ISPs
could achieve this goal by utilizing algorithms to identify when a user
is engaging in shaming activities and prompt that user with a
warning before completing the act. This Note therefore seeks to
highlight the powerful, yet unrealized, role that ISPs have in
lessening the prevalence of online mob shaming.
11. Google Search for Justine Sacco, GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/?gwsrd=ssl#q=justine+sacco [https://perma.cclN5KC-ZGFL] (last visited
Jan. 23, 2016) (search: "Justine Sacco").
12. See Lately, supra note 8.
13. See infra Section I.B.2 (comparing online shaming to other torts).
14. See id. (discussing how online shaming does not fit into the definition of the tort of
defamation).
15. See Russell Brandom, Finding Fuboy: One Man Spent Four Years and $35,000 to
Unmask His Internet Troll, VERGE (Nov. 23, 2015, 8:50 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2015
/ 11/ 2 3/9 7 7 2824/commenter-defamation-lawsuit-identity-revealed [https://perma.cclEE28-DJD4].
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I. GRAB YOUR PITCHFORKS: How ONLINE PUBLIC SHAMING HAS
EXPLODED IN POPULARITY
A. Colonial Public Shaming in America
While the concept of online public shaming is a recent
phenomenon fostered by the mainstream use of the Internet, the
concept of public shaming itself has existed for centuries.
16 In colonial
America, public shaming was particularly popular as a form of
punishment.17 In those days, the town square was used as a place to
lock individuals in stockades and post signs stating the nature of the
infraction committed by the individual.
18 Nathaniel Hawthorne's
novel The Scarlet Letter exemplifies the nature of public shaming in
colonial days, in which protagonist Hester Prynne is shamed by being
forced to wear a scarlet "A" on her chest, signifying her status as an
individual who had an affair.19 Public shaming punishments were
especially feared in small towns where individuals largely knew
everyone who lived in the area.
20 Urbanization and the Industrial
Revolution increased mobility of Americans, and public shaming
punishments subsided as the centrality and importance of town
centers in local communities decreased.21 Additionally, the emergence
of the prison system decreased the prevalence of public shaming
punishments.22
B. Public Shaming 2.0: The Rise of Online Public Shaming
While the use of stockades in town squares to shame antisocial
behavior is a relic of the past, the use of public shaming techniques
has evolved and made a fierce comeback in the digital age. One
important difference between state-sanctioned public shaming
punishments and online public shaming is that online public shaming
can occur for non-criminal acts.23 Legal scholar Daniel Solove has
explained this form of online public shaming as "norm enforcement."
24
16. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 91 (2007).
17. Lauren M. Goldman, Note, Trending Now: The Use of Social Media Websites in
Public Shaming Punishments, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 415, 418 (2015) (explaining how colonial
America favored utilizing public shaming punishments).
18. Id.
19. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 43-44 (Brian Harding & Cindy
Weinstein eds., Oxford World's Classics 2007) (1850).
20. SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 91.
21. Id.; Goldman, supra note 17, at 421.
22. SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 92.
23. Id. at 84-85.
24. Id.
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Norm enforcement occurs when individuals seek to correct behavior
that does not comply with the perceived norm, or rule of conduct in
society.25 It can also occur silently, leaving the offender unaware of
the alleged norm infraction.26 This "quiet" norm enforcement is the
genesis of several trends in online public shaming.27 The kinds of
norms enforced online can vary from etiquette norms to perceived
norms about one's appearance and habits.28 Various iterations of
"norm-enforcing" tools have emerged online in past years, including
websites cataloguing bad men to date,29 delinquent taxpayers,30 and
the difficulty level of college professors.3 1
Further exemplifying this trend, the Peeple app debuted in
2015 as a new holistic norm enforcement tool. Initially advertised as a
"positivity app," Peeple was marketed on the platform that individuals
could rate anyone on a scale of one to five.32 The app would enable
users to create a profile for a third party whom they wanted to rate,
regardless of whether the third party wished to be a part of Peeple.33
Furthermore, accounts created without the consent of the third party
did not have a "delete" option.34 Dubbed "Yelp for People" by the
Washington Post, Internet backlash regarding the app was swift and
almost entirely negative.35 After the backlash, the creators of the app
considerably changed the app's core functions, instead requiring that
individuals opt in before receiving reviews on the app and giving the
app's users the ability to hide negative comments.36
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 86.
28. Id.
29. See Molly McHugh, Rating Men on LuLu Isn't Atoning for the Web's Chauvinism,
It's Just Cruel, DIGITAL TRENDS (June 19, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://www.digitaltrends.com
/social-media/rating-men-on-lulu-isnt-atoning-for-the-webs-chauvinism-its-just-cruell
[https://perma.ce/748H-XK5Y].
30. Tax Delinquents List, MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/dor/individuals/tax
-delinquents-list.html [https://perma.cc/HB73-G6Z2] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
31. RATE MY PROFESSORS, http://ratemyprofessors.com [https://perma.cc/KF23-QX3B]
(last visited Feb. 4, 2017).
32. Dewey, supra note 7.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Dewey, supra note 7; Maddy Meyers, The "Peeple" App, Referred to as Yelp for
People, Sounds Like a Bad Dream, MARY SUE (Sept. 30, 2015, 5:17 PM),
http://www.themarysue.com/peeple-app-bad-dream/ [http://perma.cc/WXL3-2LTJ]; see also Elle
Hunt, Peeple Review People: The User-Review App You Didn't Dare Ask For, GUARDIAN (Oct. 1,
2015, 4:48 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/oct/01/peeple-review-people-the
-user-review-app-you-didnt-dare-ask-for [https://perma.cc/RMC7-KL7X].
36. Caitlin Dewey, Peeple, the Terrifying "Yelp for People," Is (Sort of) Launching March
7, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp
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While online norm enforcement can take the form of specialized
apps-Peeple, for instance-individuals commonly enforce social
norms through a diverse array of methods online, such as "liking"
Facebook postings, sharing articles, or commenting on YouTube
videos.37  However, the meaning of those online actions can be
indeterminate and can change over time.38 For example, a 2016
incident involving the killing of a gorilla named Harambe in a
Cincinnati zoo after a child entered the gorilla's enclosure sparked
outrage online.39  Initial online postings and petitions after the
gorilla's death shamed the child's mother for a perceived lack of
accountability over her child's actions.40 Meanwhile, others shamed
the role of zoos, claiming that it was captivity that had ultimately
claimed the gorilla's life. 41  However, notably, some individuals
"shamed the shamers," and outrage about the Internet's reaction to
the gorilla's death ultimately eclipsed outrage about the actual
incident.42 By mid-summer 2016, the "Harambe meme" was born,
with journalists noting that the meme persists "because it is, at its
heart, a criticism of the online cultural environment that creates a
phenomenon like the outrage at Harambe's death."43
One possible explanation for the upswing in online norm
enforcement that has resulted in online "outrage culture" is the fact
that it provides an opportunity for individuals to passively indicate
that they do not endorse certain socially offensive behavior.44 By
12015/10/05/after-internet-backlash-peeple-co-founder-will-revise-her-app-to-make-it-positivel
[http://perma.ccl56C5-MSEHI.
37. See Kate Klonick, Re-Shaming the Debate: Social Norms, Shame, and Regulation in
an Internet Age, 75 MD. L. REV. 1029, 1053 (2016) (noting that acts of online norm enforcement
can have indeterminate social meaning).
38. Id.
39. Mike McPhate, Gorilla Killed After Child Enters Enclosure at Cincinnati Zoo, N.Y.
TIMES (May 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/30/us/gorilla-killed-after-child
-enters-enclosure-at-cincinnati-zoo.html [https://perma.cc/UZM5-9HPH].
40. Sheila Hurt, Justice for Harambe, CHANGE.COM,
https://www.change.org/p/cincinnati-zoo-justice-for-harambe [https://perma.cc/B6QY-8BW4] (last
visited Jan. 23, 2017).
41. Marais Jacon-Duffy, PETA Says Harambe's Death Is an Example of 'Captivity
Taking an Animal's Life', WCPO CINCINNATI, http://www.wepo.cominews/local-news/peta-says-
harambes- death-is-an-example-of-captivity-taking-an-animals-life http://perma.cc/V2EJ-M5RD]
(last updated May 29, 2016, 6:45 PM).
42. Alex Abad-Santos, Harambe the Gorilla: The Zoo Killing That's Set the Internet on
Fire, Explained, VOX (June 1, 2016, 2:42 PM), http://www.vox.com/2016/5/31/11813640/harambe-
gorilla-cincinnati-zoo-killed [https://perma.cclLQW6-Q5FNI.
43. Abby Ohlheiser, The Internet Won't Let Harambe Rest in Peace, WASH. POST (July
27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/07/27/the-internet-wont
-let-harambe-rest-in-peace/ [http://perma.cc/N5NR-CVNY].
44. Jillian Jordan, Paul Bloom, Moshe Hoffman & David Rand, What's the Point of
Moral Outrage?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com
2016/02/28/opinion/sunday/whats-the-point-of-moral-outrage.html [http://perma.cc/BL25-F4J9].
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reprimanding offensive behavior, individuals can effectively and easily
signal to others that they are trustworthy because they punished a
norm violator.45 Posting a comment condemning the actions of Justine
Sacco or Walter Palmer may not only signal to others that the
commenter does not endorse their behavior, but also that the
commenter is credible because he or she took actions to shame the
norm violator. However, as the "Harambe meme" demonstrates, the
meaning of acts of online norm enforcement is neither definite, nor
static. Someone sharing a story about a gorilla's death may be doing
so for a variety of reasons: out of genuine concern for the animal,
ironically, or without much thought at all.46 Regardless of the precise
meaning of acts of online norm enforcement, this online commentary
can be made cheaply, quickly, and indelibly, much to the detriment of
shamed individuals.
1. The Critical Role of Anonymity and Shaming's Disproportionate
Effects
Online anonymity and few cost barriers have contributed to the
surge in online public shaming. The anonymity that the Internet
provides enables some individuals to dodge accountability and any
kind of tangible fallout from derisive statements they make about
other individuals online.47  Engaging in an act of online norm
enforcement is also inexpensive; an individual simply needs Internet
access, which 3.2 billion individuals are estimated to have.48 This
mentality has produced an increase in "drive-by relationships," a term
describing a user's ability to anonymously and cheaply post ad
hominem attacks and then quickly duck out of the situation.49 This
leaves the victim of the drive-by stuck with unsavory
reputation-damaging content online, with little recourse to identify
the poster. The concept of a "drive-by relationship" is simple; it is
much easier to criticize someone's actions when you can do so
anonymously.
45. Id.
46. See Klonick, supra note 37, at 1053 ("[I]ndeterminacy is true of the vast majority of
online acts of social norm enforcement-re-Tweeting a message; sharing a link; commenting
anonymously on a blog; liking something on Facebook-the acts themselves are so small,
discrete, and instant that they do not necessarily have a clear social meaning.").
47. SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 140.
48. Internet Users, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-
users/#trend [https://perma.cc/VM4K-MW3M] (last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
49. SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 141; see also ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 177 (2000).
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One way for an individual to track down an online poster is
through the poster's Internet Protocol, or IP, address.50  Every
machine has a unique IP address that facilitates communications with
other computers.51 However, IP addresses are not unique to an
individual person; an IP address, by itself, is nothing more than a
string of numbers.52 Currently, there is no universal online "login"
system that attaches specific credentials to each individual online
user; IP addresses are assigned to computers, not to people.
53
Consequently, the existence of an IP address alone, without additional
identifying information, cannot pinpoint the absolute identity of an
online poster.54 Due to these constraints, victims of online attacks
often have limited means to unmask their tormentors.
In contrast to the ease and low costs of shaming norm violators
online, the consequences of shaming on its victims are
disproportionately severe. The effects of shaming often balloon out of
proportion when compared to the alleged norm violation.
55 Instances
of online shaming do not provide due process rights to the victim; they
are afforded no hearing to establish facts regarding the alleged norm
infraction.56 The shaming that occurred after the 2016 Cincinnati Zoo
incident exemplifies this lack of due process; was the mother
inattentive, or did the child simply manage to slip away? Many
shamed the mother of the child without establishing these crucial
facts.57
The lack of fact-establishing safeguards associated with
shaming can skew news coverage of instances of shaming, thereby
unintentionally adding to the pile-on effect by drawing more attention
to the alleged norm violator.5 8 The harms of shaming are further
amplified by the indelible nature of shaming content that can be
catalogued in perpetuity online. Exemplifying this harm, the Sacco
Twitter incident is still the first item retrieved after performing a
50. See Joshua J. McIntyre, Comment, Balancing Expectations of Privacy: Why Internet
Protocol (IP) Addresses Should Be Protected as Personally Identifiable Information, 60 DEPAUL
L. REV. 895, 896 (2011).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 908.
53. Id. at 910.
54. Id.
55. Kionick, supra note 37, at 1045; SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 95-96.
56. See SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 96-98.
57. See Laura Coates, Gorilla Shooting: When a Child's Death Draws Less Outrage than
Harambe, CNN (June 1, 2016, 8:31 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/01/opinions/harambe
-gorilla-shooting-coates/ [https:/perma.cc/EZ8T-GGHC].
58. Kelly McBride, Journalism and Public Shaming: Some Guidelines, POYNTER
(Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.poynter.org/2015/journalism-and-public-shaming-some
-guidelines/326097/ [https://perma.cc/X5Y8-29CP].
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Google search of Sacco's name, despite Sacco's atonement and the
passing of several years since the incident.59 Consequently, online
public shaming can serve as a "one-two" punch: the shaming can occur
without any critical fact-establishing due process safeguards and can
continually impact an individual's future due to the everlasting nature
of online content, even if that content is distorted or factually
incorrect.
2. The Important Distinction Between Online Shaming, Defamation,
and Other Torts
While there is currently no tort of "undue shaming," the tort of
defamation exists to curb undue harm to individuals' reputations.
Defamation is a state-law claim, so the applicable elements vary
slightly from state to state.60 The Restatement of Torts states that a
prima facie case of defamation requires a plaintiff to prove the
existence of: (a) a false and defamatory communication concerning
another, (b) an unprivileged publication61 to a third party, (c) fault
amounting to at least negligence on behalf of the publisher, and (d)
either the actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or
the existence of special harm caused by the publication.62
The tort of defamation extends liability beyond the original
defamer.63 Individuals who repeat or otherwise republish defamatory
communications are subject to the same degree of liability as the
original speaker of such content.64 For example, a newspaper that
actively selects and edits content for publication would be considered a
publisher and face liability for publishing defamatory content.65
However, mere distributors of defamatory content, such as bookstores
or libraries, generally only face liability for defamatory content when
the distributor knows or has reason to know of the defamatory
communication but transmits such a communication nonetheless.66
59. Google Search for Justine Sacco, GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/?gwsrd=ssl#q=justine+sacco [https://perma.cc/N5KC-ZGFL] (last visited
Jan. 23, 2016) (search: "Justine Sacco").
60. 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 15 (2016) ("An individual's interest in his or her
reputation is a basic concern, but its reflection in the laws of defamation is solely a matter of
state law.").
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977) ("Any act by
which the defamatory matter is intentionally or negligently communicated to a third person is a
publication.").
62. Id. § 558.
63. Id. § 578.
64. Id.
65. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 1 LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4:92 (2d ed. 2016).
66. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
730 [Vol. XlX:3:721
TAMING THE INTERNET PITCHFORK MOB
Since distributors serve merely as the physical means to the
republication of defamatory content, a distributor who transmits a
defamatory communication without knowledge of its defamatory
nature is consequently shielded from liability.
67 It is important to
note that imposing liability upon publishers and distributors of
defamatory content has had large implications with the advent of the
Internet, where web hosts regularly post and edit third-party content.
The consequences of imposing publisher and distributor liability upon
ISPs that host third-party tortious content is discussed in full detail in
Part II.
Despite being designed to remedy reputational harms, the tort
of defamation cannot necessarily help victims of online public
shaming. The tort of defamation hinges upon the issuance of a
falsehood-stating an unpopular opinion, or criticizing someone for his
or her actions, does not equate to uttering a falsehood about
someone.68 For example, posting a tweet that states "Shame on
Walter Palmer for killing Cecil the Lion" or "Check out how ignorant
Justine Sacco's tweet is" is not inherently defamatory-the poster is
not stating falsehoods about either individual. Even if a plaintiff is
able to state a claim for defamation-for example, a scenario wherein
a blogger falsely accuses an individual of having sexually transmitted
diseases-there are further difficulties litigating such cases, as
litigation is expensive and time consuming, making it an unlikely
avenue for the average individual to pursue.
Online public shaming victims could also pursue the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
69 The elements of a
successful IIED claim are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct with
either the intention of, or reckless disregard for, causing emotional
distress; (2) the suffering by the plaintiff of severe or extreme
emotional distress; and (3) actual or proximate causation.
70 While
certain extreme instances of shaming could conceivably satisfy the
basic elements of an IIED claim, plaintiffs face the same issues as
those in litigating other online torts: tracking down a defendant in
such cases can be difficult, if not impossible; litigation is expensive
and time consuming; and the volume of harmful online content
67. SMOLLA, supra note 65, at § 4:92; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (AM. LAW
INST. 1977).
68. "To create liability for defamation there must be . . . a false and defamatory
statement concerning another." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 588(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1977)
(emphasis added).
69. 136 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Proof of Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress § 1 (2013).
70. Id. § 4.
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renders success against one individual defendant inadequate in the
face of the tidal wave of harmful online postings stored elsewhere.
Online public shaming can also evolve into other types of online
harms. Far from simply voicing disapproval of a norm violator's
behavior, shaming can take a dark turn into "doxing,"71 and even
calling for sexual violence or other physical harms against an
individual.72 These actions can be categorized as cyber harassment,
especially when online mobs repeatedly act to target a specific
individual.73 This raises questions as to when acts of online public
shaming and norm enforcement break down into forms of online
harassment. Legal scholar Kate Klonick notes that "[o]nline shaming
often turns into cyber bullying and harassment he more attenuated
the social actions become from the nexus of social norm
enforcement."74 Consequently, the development of policies to deter the
prevalence of online public shaming should be included in any
conversation about how to address online harassment more generally.
II. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AND SUBSEQUENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN ISP LIABILITY FOR THIRD-PARTY STATEMENTS
Several options exist for reducing the prevalence of online
public shaming. First, individuals could engage in online shaming
less often. However, due to the low costs of entry, online anonymity,
and perhaps a lack of awareness or consideration of long-term
repercussions of shaming, it is unlikely that individuals will
unilaterally choose to reduce shaming behavior unless the behavior
becomes unfashionable or otherwise detrimental.75 Second, web hosts
could remove shaming posts; however, policing shaming in this
manner would likely be largely impracticable and lead to inevitable
free speech concerns. Third, web hosts could espouse a moderate
approach by warning users about the consequences of shaming by
employing algorithms and filters that detect shaming activity. Web
hosts that take such actions to filter content for its propensity to
71. "Doxing" is the act of intentionally publishing someone's personal data, such as a
home address or social security number online. Sameer Hinduja, Doxing and Cyberbulling,
CYBERBULLYING RES. CTR. (Sept. 16, 2015), http://cyberbullying.org/doxing-and-cyberbullying
[https://perma.cclT8QF-GC5H].
72. See Klonick, supra note 37, at 1034.
73. See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 3 (2014) ("[Clyber
harassment is often understood to involve the intentional infliction of substantial emotional
distress accomplished by online speech that is persistent enough to amount to a 'course of
conduct' rather than an isolated instance.").
74. Klonick, supra note 37, at 1034.
75. The idea that online public shaming becomes less fashionable is plausible and
arguably already occurring, given the birth of the "Harambe meme." See supra Section I.B.
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shame would not become liable as publishers or distributors for
third-party online content under Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act. Consequently, web hosts have an untapped potential to
reduce the prevalence of online public shaming. The following section
explores, in detail, the Communications Decency Act and its
revolutionary impact upon liability for the publication or distribution
of third-party statements online.
A. The Advent of the Communications Decency Act
The Internet presented uncharted territory to both lawmakers
and courts alike. While the concept of publisher and distributor
liability for the reproduction of defamatory statements is fairly
straightforward in the context of traditional media, such as
newspapers,76 it was unclear if the same rules would be practicable in
the age of the Internet.
In 1991, the first recorded "cybertort" case,77 Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe,7 8 held ISP CompuServe not liable for defamatory
comments made by one of its posters when CompuServe did not screen
the content its users posted.79 After Cubby, it appeared that ISPs
would be held to the distributor liability standard: so long as an ISP
did not know that a third party's content was defamatory, it would
face no liability in distributing the content online.
8 0 However, it
remained unclear as to whether traditional publisher liability would
apply in the same way to online defamatory communications.
8 1
Distinguishable from Cubby, another initial case involving
Internet defamation, Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services, imposed
publisher liability on a defendant ISP that posted an individual user's
defamatory statements in 1995.82 In Stratton Oakmont, a subscriber
to ISP Prodigy Services posted a comment on its online bulletin board
accusing Stratton Oakmont, a securities investment banking firm, of
making fraudulent securities offerings.
83 When Stratton Oakmont
sued ISP Prodigy, the court ruled that Prodigy could be held liable
76. See discussion of publisher and distributor liability for reproducing defamation,
supra Section I.B.2.
77. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L.
REV. 335, 364 (2005) ("The first cybertort case was decided in 1991, when CompuServe, Inc. was
held not liable for a third party's publication of defamatory statements on its services.").
78. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 137-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
79. Id. at 141.
80. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 77, at 366.
81. Id. at 365.
82. See Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *1
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995); Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140.
83. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *1.
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under publisher liability, thereby finding Prodigy liable for the
defamation as if it were the original poster on the bulletin board.8 4
Unlike ISP CompuServe, which did not filter any of its posters'
commentary,85 ISP Prodigy filtered content in accordance with its
family-focused goals.86  Oddly enough, Prodigy's content filtering
subjected Prodigy to harsher publisher liability, while CompuServe's
complete lack of filtering is what enabled it to be saved by the more
lenient standard of distributor liability instead.87
This new era of common law decisions regarding ISP liability
created a perverse incentive: if ISPs did not moderate anything their
users posted, they would be less likely to face harsh publisher's
liability.88 The practical effects of a Stratton Oakmont-influenced
Internet landscape could result in a largely un-moderated Internet, as
it incentivized web hosts to refuse to edit or modify any of their users'
statements to avoid getting sued under publisher liability. 89
In light of the Cubby and Stratton Oakmont decisions, ISPs
petitioned Congress to enact legislation-the Communications
Decency Act (CDA)-shielding them from such widespread publisher
liability under a Stratton Oakmont regime.90 The CDA's sponsors
feared that imposing common law publisher liability on ISPs would
incentivize ISPs to refuse to moderate content whatsoever in order to
avoid liability, resulting in a lawless Internet filled with pornography
and other obscenities that children could accidentally view.91
Consequently, the CDA was marketed as a way to prevent obscene
materials online from getting into the hands of children without
chilling free speech.92 Proponents of the bill recognized that it would
be impossible for the government to completely censor obscene
material, noting that ". . . the Internet operates worldwide, and not
84. Id. at *4.
85. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140.
86. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *2; see Rustad & Koenig, supra note 77, at
367.
87. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 77, at 367.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 368.
91. H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) ("One of the specific purposes of this section is
to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated
such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they
have restricted access to objectionable material. The conferees believe that such decisions create
serious obstacles to the important federal policy of empowering parents to determine the content
of communications their children receive through interactive computer services.")
92. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (2012) ("It is the policy of the United States . . . to remove
disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that
empower parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable and inappropriate material
online.").
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even a Federal Internet censorship army would give our Government
the power to keep offensive materials out of the hands of the children
who use the new interactive media."93
The CDA's sponsors emphasized that private citizens-not the
government-would be best suited to create a "21st century policy" for
the Internet.94 In order to achieve the crucial balance of filtering
obscenity with preserving unfettered speech online, the CDA included
a "safe harbor" provision for ISPs in Section 230(c).95 This section,
entitled "Protection for 'Good Samaritan' blocking and screening of
offensive materials," explicitly exempted ISPs from being subject to
publisher liability or treated as publishers, stating that "[n]o provider
or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider."96  Section 230(c)(2) also explicitly
protected ISPs attempting to remove objectionable content from
exposure to civil liability.97
One of the first cases to apply Section 230(c), Zeran v. America
Online, Inc., involved a post on an AOL bulletin board directing phone
calls for purchasing t-shirts with incendiary slogans relating to the
1995 Oklahoma City bombing to Zeran's phone number.98 Zeran, who
had nothing to do with selling such t-shirts, received a barrage of
angry phone calls, some of which included death threats.
99 Although
AOL took down the initial post, subsequent similar postings appeared,
and Zeran was again bombarded with threats.100 Zeran sued AOL,
alleging that AOL both failed to remove the postings in a timely
manner after Zeran had given notice and failed to screen for further
defamatory postings.10' Zeran further argued that Section 230(c)
mentioned nothing explicitly about extending a "safe harbor" to
93. 141 CONG. REC. H8472 (1995) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) ("[The CDA] allows
parents to make the important decisions with regard to what their children can access, not the
government. It doesn't violate free speech or the right of adults to communicate with each
other.").
94. 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (statement of Mr. Wyden) ("[T]he new media is simply
different. We have the opportunity to build a 21st century policy for the Internet employing the
technologies and the creativity designed by the private sector.").
95. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). It is also important to note that another section of the CDA, 47
U.S.C. § 223 (2012), outlawed the transmission of "patently offensive communications" via
interactive computer services. This statute was deemed unconstitutional in Reno v. American
Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997), for being overbroad and not sufficiently tailored
to achieve the government's interest in protecting children from obscenities online.
96. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
97. Id.
98. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 330.
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distributors; as such, Zeran argued he should be able to sue AOL
under a theory of distributor liability. 10 2 The Fourth Circuit rejected
Zeran's argument, noting that:
... notice cannot transform one from an original publisher to a distributor. ...
[Olnce a computer service provider receives notice of a potentially defamatory
posting, it is thrust into the role of a traditional publisher. The computer service
provider must decide whether to publish, edit, or withdraw the posting. 103
Consequently, distributors were entitled to the same level of deference
under Section 230(c) as publishers.10 4
The wide-reaching effects of Zeran were amplified by the 1998
District Court for the District of Columbia's decision in Blumenthal v.
Drudge in which plaintiffs brought a defamation suit against "Drudge
Report" creator Matt Drudge and AOL for an article that claimed that
Blumenthal, a White House staffer, abused his spouse.105 Drudge had
a licensing agreement with AOL, making the Drudge Report available
to all AOL members.106  Drudge was able to create, edit, and
"otherwise manage" content, but AOL retained the right to remove
content that violated its terms of service.10 7 Despite AOL's exercise of
some editorial control over Drudge's work and its profiting from the
benefits of the CDA immunity scheme without "accepting any of the
burdens that Congress intended," Section 230(c) rendered AOL
immune from suit.108 Importantly, in Blumenthal, AOL actively
promoted its online gossip column, a marked departure from its role
as mere passive host to bulletin boards in Zeran.109
B. The Post-Zeran Landscape: Broad ISP Immunity
After Zeran and Blumenthal, courts have generally recognized
three requisite criteria in order for Section 230 immunity to apply to a
defendant ISP.110 First, a defendant must be the provider or user of
102. Id. at 331.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 46-48 (D.D.C. 1998).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 52-53.
109. Compare Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329 (ISP AOL immune from liability under Section 230
when serving as forum for users to make postings on online bulletin boards), with Blumenthal,
992 F. Supp. at 47 (ISP AOL immune from liability under Section 230 when retaining ability to
remove certain content created by third party contractor and promoting gossip column).
110. See Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc, 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (2011) ("A
defendant is therefore immune from state law liability if (1) it is a 'provider or user of an
interactive computer service'; (2) the complaint seeks to hold the defendant liable as a 'publisher
or speaker'; and (3) the action is based on 'information provided by another information content
provider."'); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 544, 548 (E.D.
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an "interactive computer service."111 The CDA defines an "interactive
computer service" as "any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer access to the
Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or
educational institutions."11 2  Many types of online services have
qualified as interactive computer services, including classified ad sites
such as Craigslist, dating websites, and social media platforms such as
MySpace and Facebook.113 Second, the claim must treat the defendant
interactive computer service as the publisher or speaker of the
information.114 Third, another user, separate from the ISP, must have
created the disputed content.15 This third criterion has raised many
questions in its application; if an ISP crosses the line from existing as
a passive "interactive computer service" to serving as an "information
content provider" pursuant to the CDA, the ISP may not qualify for
Section 230 immunity.116 In other words, ISPs are generally not liable
for hosting third-party tortious content. As such, web hosts have a
marked interest in ensuring that they take the appropriate steps to
avoid crossing over to the side of the CDA that exposes them to
liability.
Following in the ISP-deferential steps of Zeran and
Blumenthal, however, courts have been reluctant to deem ISPs
"information content providers" when they are performing editorial
functions, choosing to remove or add content, or making minor
adjustments to third-party content. For example, in Ben Ezra,
Weinstein, and Co. v. America Online, Inc., the Tenth Circuit found
Va. 2008) ("Courts engage in a three-part inquiry when determining the attachment of immunity
under the CDA."); Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 39-40 (2001).
111. See Shiamili, 952 N.E.2d at 1015; Nemet, 564 F. Supp. 2d. at 548; Schneider, 31
P.3d at 39-40.
112. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2012).
113. See Doe v. MySpace Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008) (social networking
website qualifies as interactive computer service); Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under
Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (online classified ad service
qualifies as interactive computer service); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119,
1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (online dating service qualifies as interactive computer service).
114. See Shiamili, 952 N.E.2d at 1015; Nemet, 564 F. Supp. 2d. at 548; Schneider, 31
P.3d at 39-40.
115. See Shiamili, 952 N.E.2d at 1015; Nemet, 564 F. Supp. 2d. at 548; Schneider, 31
P.3d at 39-40.
116. An "information content provider" is "any person or entity that is responsible, in
whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or
any other interactive computer service." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). The distinction between
"interactive computer service" and "information content provider" has been discussed at length.
See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC., 521 F.3d 1157, 1163-74 (9th Cir. 2008);
Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123 ("Under the statutory scheme, an 'interactive computer service'
qualifies for immunity so long as it does not also function as an 'information content provider' for
the portion of the statement or publication at issue.").
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that AOL's minor edits of stock quotations provided by a third party or
deletion of incorrect stock information provided by a third party did
not turn AOL into an "information content provider" of that content.117
In Batzel v. Smith, the Ninth Circuit found that an ISP that made
minor alterations to an allegedly defamatory third-party email before
replicating the email on a listserv also did not count as an
"information content provider" of that content.118 In Carafano v.
Metrosplash, an anonymous harasser created a fake profile for actress
Christine Carafano on a dating website and posted Carafano's home
address and phone number.119 After receiving numerous threats,
Carafano sued the dating service, Matchmaker.com, alleging invasion
of privacy, misappropriation of the right of publicity, defamation, and
negligence.120 The Ninth Circuit deemed Matchmaker.com's Section
230(c) defense as valid despite Matchmaker.com contributing to the
creation of dating profiles with questionnaires designed to format
users' profiles, noting that "[u]nder Section 230(c) . . . so long as a
third party willingly provides the essential published content, the
interactive service provider receives full immunity regardless of the
specific editing or selection process."12 1
While the Ninth Circuit took a stand in 2008 by denying
Section 230 immunity to ISPs who "materially contribute" to alleged
illegal conduct,122 the trend of wide judicial deference to ISPs under
the Section 230 framework has otherwise largely continued. In 2014,
the Sixth Circuit held in Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment hat a
web host does not forfeit Section 230 immunity even when that host
encourages or otherwise ratifies third-party tortious content.123 Jones
involved controversial site TheDirty.com, a non-celebrity gossip site,
where users could post about members of the community without fact-
checks or other verifications for accuracy.124 Site creator Nik Richie
would then comment on the users' postings, often encouraging his
"dirty Army" to find more information on its targets.125 The district
117. See Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985-86 (10th Cir.
2000).
118. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2003).
119. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1121.
120. Id. at 1122.
121. Id. at 1124.
122. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1167-70 (9th Cir.
2008) (finding ISP that designed website intended to solicit and enforce allegedly illegal housing
preferences "materially contributed" to the illegality and was therefore not entitled to Section
230 immunity).
123. Jones v. Dirty World Entm't Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 401-03 (6th Cir. 2014).
124. Id.
125. Jones v. Dirty World Entm't Recordings, LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d 818, 823 (E.D. Ky.
2013).
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court ruled that TheDirty.com forfeited its Section 230 immunity due
to this editorial commentary encouraging users to find more "dirt" on
others, ruling that
a website owner [that] intentionally encourages illegal or actionable third-party
postings to which he adds his own comments ratifying or adopting the posts
becomes a 'creator' or 'developer' of that content and is not entitled to immunity.1
26
The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that an "encouragement"
test was not proper for determining whether an ISP lost immunity
under the CDA. 127 Since plaintiff Sarah Jones was suing because of
the defamatory third-party statements posted on TheDirty.com, and
not based upon the subsequent editorial commentary of site creator
Nik Richie, Section 230 prevented Jones from bringing her defamation
suit against Richie.128 The Sixth Circuit further noted that the
underlying purpose of the CDA was to promote a free and open
Internet, and the CDA should be read in accordance with this
principle.129
C. Scholarly Critiques of the CDA Incentive Framework
ISP-deferential judicial interpretations of the CDA have left
many plaintiffs in online defamation cases exasperated and largely
without remedy. Many legal scholars have criticized both the
inadequate incentive scheme for ISPs created by the structure of
Section 230 as well as the broad judicial deference ISPs receive in
litigation involving application of Section 230.130 Courts have also
taken note of the odd incentive schemes created by the CDA
framework; in Doe v. GTE, a 2003 Seventh Circuit case that involved a
defendant ISP that raised a Section 230 defense, Judge Easterbrook
noted:
126. Id. at 821.
127. Jones, 755 F.3d at 414.
128. Id. at 415-16.
129. Id. at 415.
130. See Heather Saint, Note, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act: The True
Culprit of Internet Defamation, 36 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 39, 41 (2014) (noting sweeping judicial
deference given to ISPs under the CDA); Patricia Spiccia, Note, The Best Things in Life Are Not
Free: Why Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Should Be Earned
and Not Freely Given, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 369, 370 (2013) (noting that the CDA does not
incentivize ISPs to assist victims of defamation).
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... [Section] 230(c) as a whole makes ISPs indifferent to the content of
information they host or transmit: whether they do ... or do not ... take
precautions, there is no liability under state or federal law. As precautions are
costly, not only in direct outlay but also in lost revenue from the filtered customers,
ISPs may be expected to take the do-nothing option and enjoy immunity under
Section 230(c)(1).131
Among proposed changes to the current CDA framework, some
have advocated for the addition of notice and takedown procedures for
defamatory materials posted online, modeled after the current notice
and takedown provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.132
This would serve to balance the goals of the CDA with the need for
victims of online attacks to remove defamatory content.133 Others
have called for amending the CDA to deny immunity to ISPs that
make editorial publication decisions and therefore serve as more than
mere conduits to third-party content.134 More drastically, others have
suggested repealing the CDA in its entirety and returning to the use
of notice-based liability for third-party tortious content imposed upon
ISPs that was used before the CDA's passage.135
While imperfect, the CDA has arguably fostered the free
growth and expansion of the Internet; one scholar notes that "Section
230 is the breathing space for the Internet's extraordinarily free
expression."13 6  Others feel that reverting back to common law
notice-based liability for ISPs for distributing tortious content would
irreparably stall the free-flowing nature of information online due to
an increase in the marginal cost of each users' postings.137 The
Electronic Frontier Foundation notes that Section 230 is "perhaps the
most influential law to protect the kind of innovation that has allowed
131. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003).
132. See Olivera Medenica & Kaiser Wahab, Does Liability Enhance Credibility? Lessons
from the DMCA Applied to Online Defamation, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 237, 239 (2007)
(advocating for DMCA-styled notice and takedown provisions to be added to Section 230 of the
CDA).
133. Id.
134. See Saint, supra note 130, at 66.
135. See Matthew G. Jeweler, Note, The Communications Decency Act of 1996: Why § 230
Is Outdated and Publisher Liability for Defamation Should Be Reinstated Against Internet
Service Providers, 8 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 3, 3 (2007) ("[W]ith the Internet being the
dominant medium that it is, the CDA is outdated and unfair, and should be amended or repealed
in favor of the common law frambwork for publisher liability in defamation.").
136. William H. Freivogel, Does the Communications Decency Act Foster Indecency?, 16
COMM. L. & POLY 17, 20 (2011).
137. See Cecelia Ziniti, Note, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service Providers:
How Zeran v. Am, Online Got It Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 583,
600-01 (2008).
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the Internet to thrive since 1996."138 However, despite its existing
issues, the CDA is unlikely to be amended in an age of Congressional
gridlock. Consequently, the CDA, despite its controversies, must be
considered when determining the extent to which ISPs can act in
reducing offensive third-party content online.
III. How WEB HOSTS CAN AND SHOULD UTILIZE THE EXISTING SECTION
230(C) FRAMEWORK TO TAME THE MOB
The CDA's framework, by both its design and judicial
interpretations, grants ISPs the ability to develop web-hosting policies
of their choosing and moderate content without the fear of facing
liability for publishing or distributing potentially tortious content
created by third parties.139 ISPs enjoy this broad immunity for the
editorial choices they do or do not make in removing objectionable
content under the CDA. ISPs, therefore, have untapped potential
under the CDA to curb the prevalence of online shaming. This Note
suggests that ISPs can achieve this goal by altering the choice
architecture that users engage with to inform users about the dangers
of shaming before engaging in shaming activity. Good choice
architecture ensures that a signal is consistent with a desired
subsequent action.140  Implementing a shaming "warning"-a
signal-would prompt an individual to engage in a desired behavior,
such as declining to engage in shaming activity. Prompting users to
consider the far-reaching consequences of online shaming beforehand
is a feasible way to lessen the prevalence of shaming without unduly
impinging upon users' free speech. Curbing the prevalence and
severity of online public shaming goes to the very heart of the CDA's
purpose: to reduce the prevalence of offensive content online.
138. CDA 230: The Most Important Law in Protecting Internet Speech, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 [https://perma.cc/E9YV-3NZ7] (last visited
Feb. 7, 2017).
139. Many judicial interpretations of Section 230 have granted immunity to ISPs that
exert editorial control over third-party content. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th
Cir. 2003) (holding that the ISP was not liable as an information content provider for allowing
potentially defamatory content to be posted on its listserv because the ISP did nothing more than
make minor alterations to original defamatory content); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am.
Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that ISP was not liable as an information
content provider when ISP altered and edited stock quotations provided by third party); see
supra Section II.A.
140. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 83-85 (2008).
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A. Altering Choice Architecture to Discourage Shaming
One powerful tool that ISPs currently have at their disposal to
diminish the prevalence of online public shaming is employing choice
architecture that would result in users declining to engage in shaming
activity.141 The idea behind choice architecture is based in "stimulus
response compatibility"-a signal that an individual receives should
be consistent with the desired outcome.142 An example of good choice
architecture is where large door pulls-a stimulus-would result in a
door opening inward, not outward, when the handles are pulled.143
When a stimulus is inconsistent with the desired outcome-a red stop
sign that has the word "GO" printed on it, for example-people make
errors, choosing to stop at the sign instead of proceeding with its
printed instructions.144 Choice architects thereby indirectly influence
the choices of others by altering available choices and cues.145 Another
example of good choice architecture is capitalizing on the
understanding that people making a decision will choose the path of
least resistance by defaulting to the optimal option.146 For example,
magazine franchises can increase their rates of subscription renewal
simply by defaulting renewal and requiring that readers opt out of the
subscription renewal if they would like to stop receiving the
magazine.147 Based on this choice architecture, more subscribers will
take the path of least resistance and keep subscribing to the magazine
instead of taking the necessary steps to unsubscribe by opting out.14 8
ISPs have taken advantage of their roles as choice architects;
for example, Google added a "Forgotten Attachment Detector" in 2008
that alerted users who mentioned the term "attachment" in the body
of an email but forgot to actually attach any files.149 ISPs could take
advantage of choice architecture to reduce shaming by prompting
users to be more contemplative before engaging in often mindless
shaming activity online. By prompting users with a "shaming"
warning, those who are contemplating engaging in an act of shaming







147. Id. at 87.
148. Id. at 85-87.
149. Jon Kotker, New in Labs: Forgotten Attachment Detector, GOOGLE BLOG
(Sept. 15, 2008), https://gmail.googleblog.com2008/09/new-in-labs-handy-intern-tweaks.html
[https://perma.cc/BC35-25XQ].
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shaming behavior could inflict upon a stranger,
150 consequently
lowering the prevalence of shaming online. Forcing an individual to
confront the harms he may inflict upon another could serve as a
deterrence function, which is especially important in an age where the
ability to engage in shaming activity is tantalizingly easy.
What would such a "shaming" warning look like in practice?
An ISP could use algorithms and other filters to detect certain
keywords or usernames that indicate that users are contemplating
engaging in shaming activities. Upon detection, the ISP would send
an automated warning to the user before completing the shaming
post. The user would be confronted with the decision to post or not to
post, but in either scenario would be advised of the possible long-term
or even unintended ramifications of shaming before actually posting
the content. Importantly, a user would have the option of posting the
shaming content nonetheless-he would simply be prompted with a
warning beforehand.
Figure 1 demonstrates what a "shaming" warning could look
like. The warning would remind individuals of the long-term and
often disproportionate effects of online public shaming and offer users
a chance to view the norm violator's public apology, if one has been
issued.151 A user could then proceed with her post, or choose to edit or
delete her post, in recognition of the warning.
Hi, [user]. It looks like your post is directed towards [norm violator].
Shaming can impose permanent and disproportionate consequences
upon this individual. You can read [norm violator]'s public apology
here. Please consider these implications before posting.
FIGURE 1
How would this work in practice? A user attempting to engage
in an act of shaming-making a shaming post on Twitter that reads
"Can't believe a mother was so irresponsible and careless at the
Cincinnati Zoo today!"-would be prompted with an iteration of the
shaming warning as described in Figure 1. The user would
subsequently be confronted with the choice of whether to proceed with
the shaming activity in light of the warning or decline. Due to the
often mindless nature of online shaming, the implementation of a
warning could prompt individuals to contemplate the harms of
shaming that may never have occurred to them.
150. See discussion of the consequences of shaming, supra Section I.B.
151. Other legal scholars have discussed the use of public apologies to combat the
prevalence of shaming. See Klonick, supra note 37, at 1063-64.
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B. Anticipated Objections
1. ISPs Lack the Incentive to Develop Anti-Shaming Policies
One anticipated objection to the proposed solution of ISPs
implementing shaming warnings is that the CDA immunizes ISPs
regardless of whether they do or do not take measures to screen
offensive content.152 As many other scholars and courts have noted in
the context of dealing with third-party defamation, many ISPs would
choose to enjoy the benefits of immunity under the CDA scheme
without spending resources on developing new anti-shaming
policies.153 However, while the CDA's incentive scheme may have
contributed to the "do nothing" approach that some ISPs have
adopted, that certainly does not mean ISPs should be written off as a
means to reduce the prevalence of online shaming. Online public
shaming is a relatively recent development that ISPs may not fully
understand or realize needs remedying. Arguably, in light of
increased societal awareness about online shaming, prudent or
progressive ISPs could investigate the potential to develop new
policies to enhance their users' experiences on their platforms. In
other words, just because the CDA structure does not require ISPs to
take action to curb shaming does not mean that ISPs should not be
encouraged to do so.
Progressive ISPs that adopt anti-shaming policies could
highlight their efforts and distinguish their services to gain more
users and obtain a competitive advantage. Major companies, such as
Twitter, are already coming into the spotlight for failures in
implementing better anti-harassment policies for their users.154
Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey recently stated that "harassment has no
place on Twitter" after a summer of controversies, including the
suspension of Breitbart News Technology Editor Milo Yiannopolous's
Twitter account, as well as actress Leslie Jones denouncing Twitter
harassment after facing a spate of racist and sexist tweets.155 While
acknowledging the prevalence of online harassment and calling for
152. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), (c)(2) (2012).
153. See Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[Section] 230(c) as a whole
makes ISPs indifferent to the content of information they host or transmit: whether they do
(subsection (c)(2)) or do not (subsection (c)(1)) take precautions, there is no liability under state
or federal law. As precautions are costly, not only in direct outlay but also in lost revenue from
the filtered customers, ISPs may be expected to take the do-nothing option and enjoy immunity
under § 230(c)(1).").
154. See Christine Yang, Jack Dorsey Said Online Harassment 'Has No Place on Twitter',
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reform is a much-needed positive step, anti-shaming policies should
become an addition to the array of harassment policies that major
Internet companies are currently developing, and it could serve to
differentiate companies competing for growth online.
2. Free Speech Concerns
Free speech concerns arise when considering the extent to
which ISPs should filter offensive online content. As some judges and
legal scholars have noted, implementing notice-based liability for
ISPs-what existed before the advent of the CDA- could lead ISPs to
remove any flagged content without properly vetting it for fear of
facing distributor liability, leading to a considerable chilling of free
speech online.156 Consequently, a successful solution must require an
ISP to weigh an online poster's right to free speech with the right of a
norm violator to be free from the permanent effects of shaming.
The proposed "shaming warning" achieves this balance. Under
the proposed solution, an individual would merely have to respond to
an additional prompt in order to complete her post.
15 7 Altering the
choice architecture involved in posting shaming content by adding a
shaming warning merely alters the decision making framework that a
user engages with before posting. A shaming warning would ideally
require a user to reflect upon the nature of her post, as well as the
deleterious effects that shaming can have on an individual, and
potentially deter the shamer from engaging in the harmful activity in
the first place.
IV. CONCLUSION
Online public shaming has exploded in popularity in the age of
the Internet. Due to the ease of creating shaming content online,
shaming's disproportionate harms, and the lack of legal recourse
available to victims, web hosts should take advantage of the sweeping
protections that the Communications Decency Act offers and begin
implementing policies to lessen the prevalence of online public
shaming. One way that web hosts can achieve this goal is by altering
the choice architecture that users engage with before posting shaming
156. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) ('The specter of tort
liability in an area of such prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect. It would be
impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of postings for possible problems.
Faced with potential liability for each message republished by their services, interactive
computer service providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages
posted."); see also Ziniti, supra note 137, at 600-01.
157. See supra Figure 1.
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material to force users to consider the effects of it before engaging in
shaming activity. The deeper message, applicable to all web users in
2016: think before you post.
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